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This paper  focuses  on  corruption  in public  procurement.  It  describes  the  contemporary
face  of  corruption  by investigating  the  role  of  public  accountability  in  the  ﬁght  against
corruption.  The  paper  describes  a speciﬁc  episode  of  corruption  relative  to the  awarding
of government  contracts  for  big  events,  such  as  the  celebration  of  the  150th  anniversary
of  Italian  uniﬁcation.  Relying  on  the philosophical  insights  of Rousseau,  Popper,  Kant  and
others, the  study  suggests  the need  for  enabling  a democratic  control  and constructing  a
public ethics  for  the  common  good.
© 2016  Elsevier  Ltd.  All  rights  reserved.
. Introduction
Corruption is a pervasive worldwide phenomenon. More than one in four people around the world report having paid a
ribe (Transparency International, 2013) and the losses caused by the spread of corruption amount to more than 5% of the
orld’s GDP (OECD, 2013b). Both developed and democratic as well as developing countries are not free from corruption
Bayley, 1966; Neu, Everett, Rahaman, & Martinez, 2013). However, in advanced countries, corruption emerges with more
igniﬁcant economic and social costs (EU Anti-Corruption Report, 2014; Kenny & Musatova, 2010; Rose-Ackerman & Stone,
996). Therefore, an extensive amount of interdisciplinary literature has explored the negative effects of corruption (e.g.,
oss of governance capacity, decrease of economy growth, income inequality or erosion of competitiveness) and the condi-
ions under which corruption is likely to take place (e.g., inefﬁcient management, a weak normative environment, lack of
ransparency and controls or an ineffective penalty system) (Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2006; Fjeldstad & Tungodden, 2003;
raycar & Villa, 2011; Sikka & Lehman, 2015).
The term corruption comes from the Latin ‘corrumpere’, meaning to destroy or adulterate, and it is somewhat of a vague
oncept, as it could refer to a broad range of behaviours (e.g., nepotism, bribery, embezzlement, favouritism or conﬂict
f interest) (Everett et al., 2006; Klitgaard, 2014). Here, we use the word corruption in reference to ‘the illegitimate use ofPlease cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
ublic or communal resources for private gain’ (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2015, p. 2; see also World Bank, 1997; International
onetary Fund, 2005). In spite of the ambiguity of the term, there seems to be general agreement in the literature that the
tate has a pivotal role in ﬁghting corruption, while there are conﬂicting perspectives on the speciﬁc tasks that it should
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undertake and perform to carry out this objective (Hopkin & Rodríguez-Pose, 2007). Therefore, different solutions have been
proposed to prevent and combat this phenomenon.
Some authors suggest that internal controls and surveillance systems could be the most powerful ways to prevent corrup-
tion (Neu et al., 2015). Hopkin and Rodríguez-Pose (2007) identify government regulation as the point at which corruption
can ﬁrst arise. This “control solution” (Everett et al., 2006, p. 6) points to the need of effective legal and institutional systems
of anti-corruption that are capable of detecting and preventing corrupt practices when they ﬁrst begin to emerge. However,
there are countries in which the existence of anti-corruption laws is of a merely symbolic nature, and ‘anti-corruption assem-
blages can be eternally optimistic yet perpetually failing’ (Sargiacomo, Ianni, D’Andreamatteo, & Servalli, 2015, p. 96). This
is the case of countries like Greece, Italy and Brazil, where an institutional and legal anti-corruption framework is in place,
yet enforcement is only sporadic (Transparency International, 2014) due to (among other factors) the excessive complexity
of the rules, the overlapping of competences and the length of judicial proceedings (European Commission, 2014a, 2014b;
Transparency International, 2014). In these settings, auditing and inscription processes may  be inadequate to face or prevent
corruption (Roberts, 2015; Sargiacomo et al., 2015; Sikka & Lehman, 2015).
On the other hand, other scholars (including Khanal, 2000; Rose-Ackerman, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 2002) and inter-
national organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Everett et al., 2006) suggest that a
‘minimal state’ can be a remedy for corruption. The neoliberal belief in the superiority of the market economy that underlies
this reasoning leads to the conclusion that one of the most effective ways to reduce corruption is to limit state intervention
through decentralization, privatization, outsourcing, deregulation and downsizing. The neoliberal approach to corruption
especially encourages the practice of outsourcing, and therefore in the last few decades, the interaction between the govern-
ment and the market in public procurement (Berrios, 2006; Lessig, 2011) has reached an unprecedented scale (Argyriades,
2010). According to the United Nations Ofﬁce of Drugs and Crime (2013), procurement is estimated to account for 15–30%
of the GDP of many countries.
In line with these ‘exit strategies’ (Everett et al., 2006, p. 5), two  public administration paradigms are dominant today:
the new public management and the new public governance. New public management symbolizes the second major wave
of neoliberalism (Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014) and assumes the public goodness of the management of
private corporations (Stiglitz, 1989) to improve the efﬁciency and effectiveness of the public sector. New public governance’s
paradigm endorses a hollow state (Foster & Plowden, 1996) that downsizes public sectors by transferring government
functions to third-party contractors (Agranoff, 2008; Valkama, Bailey, & Anttiroiko, 2013). This system implies horizontal
relationships between governments and other organizations (Almquist, Grossi, van Helden, & Reichard, 2013; Bevir, 2006)
and is structured around ‘the empirical phenomenon of policy issues or public services that are solved within networks of
actors’ (Klijn, 2012, p. 206; Kooiman, 2003).
However, the modern age dominated by these paradigms still offer fertile ground for corrupt practices (Hansson &
Holmgren, 2011; Kelleher & Yackee, 2009; Roberts, 2015; Sikka & Lehman, 2015). Some authors suggest that when economic
entities provide public services, then there is often an ‘increased decentralization of responsibilities’ (Grossi & Reichard,
2008, p. 611) and a lack of accountability (Haque, 2001). New public governance transforms the relationship between the
citizens and the state into a ‘marketized triangular public-service structure’ (Crouch, Eder, & Tambini, 2000, p. 91), in which
the intermediate providers that serve the citizen-customer on behalf of the elected representatives are not forced to be
accountable to the citizens.
Furthermore, the relegation of public functions to non-governmental actors, the adoption of business-like practices in
the public sector and the consequent change from government to governance (OECD, 2001) may  raise certain ethical issues
(Argyriades, 2010; Frederickson, 1996, 1999; Gilmour & Jensen, 1998; Kolthoff, Huberts, & Van den Heuvel, 2006; Lane,
1994). According to Argyriades (2010), this paradigmatic shift (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993) has changed the role and the
image of the public servant, leading to a loss of professional autonomy. Frederickson (1999) argues that the new public
management project multiplies the opportunities for corruption since it encourages public ofﬁcials’ selﬁsh behaviours.
Accordingly, Morales et al. (2014) conclude that ‘private sector mentalities and practices increasingly inﬂuence how the
state is conceived of and managed to the point that members of central governments and public servants come to think
and behave increasingly like business entrepreneurs’ (p. 424). In addition, given that ‘corruption is often private-to-private’
(Everett et al., 2006, p. 9), a drastic curtailing of the role of the state in the economy does not necessarily entail a reduction
of corruption. On this issue, Hopkin and Rodríguez-Pose (2007) claim that ‘corruption can be defeated without abandoning
the state’s role in protecting society from the rough edges of the market economy’ (p. 202).
Indeed, despite the case of the United States, which ranks 16th in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), (Transparency
International, 2015), seems to suggest a positive correlation between neoliberalism and a low level of corruption (see
Johnston, 2015, for an extensive analysis of the peculiarity of the United States’ case), the position at the top of the CPI
(Transparency International, 2015) of countries such as Sweden and Denmark, where the role of the state is traditionally
very strong, conﬁrm that neoliberalism is not a ‘best ﬁt for all’ solution. To the contrary, in these Northern countries, the
introduction of neoliberal mechanisms seems to raise many concerns in terms of controlling corruption because ‘resources
that previously were administered and controlled by public law now fall under civil law’ (European Commission, 2014d, p.Please cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
6) and mechanisms of transparency and public control appear to be relatively weak in the private sphere.
This paper contributes to this growing debate about the development of effective anti-corruption strategies by focusing
on the role that accountability can play in ﬁghting corruption. Accountability is here deﬁned as both a mechanism and
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 virtue. Accordingly, the research investigates the reciprocal implication of accountability and legitimacy of power, and
he mechanisms leading to the misuse of the public interest. It then leads to a deeper examination into the overlooked
elationship between public procurement and democratic accountability (Murray, 2009), thus revealing the limitations of
he neoliberal approach to corruption.
In particular, this paper enriches the existing critical accounting literature on corruption that has previously investigated
he mechanisms that construct the public ofﬁcial as an ethical subject while also examining the role of ethics in ﬁghting
orruption (Everett et al., 2006; Hoskin, 2015; Johnston, 2015; Neu et al., 2013; Neu et al., 2015; Roberts, 2015; Sargiacomo
t al., 2015; Sikka & Lehman, 2015). Indeed, the literature sheds little light on the ethical implications raised by the growing
ole of external providers (i.e., private and non-proﬁt enterprises) in public procurement (Hawkins, Gravier, & Powley,
011). Ethical issues have been raised referring to the demand side of corruption (government), while the supply side of
orruption (Sikka & Lehman, 2015) has not received a signiﬁcant amount of attention. Hence, by analysing an Italian episode
f corruption in public procurement, our research focuses more on the actors rather than on the act of corruption (Everett
t al., 2006)
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 develops the theoretical concepts informing the analysis by framing
he philosophical theories of Rousseau, Kant, Popper and others within the debate about anti-corruption strategies. Section
 focuses on research methodology and the methods of analysis. Sections 4 and 5 provide the details of the case analysis;
he ﬁnal section presents the implications and conclusions.
. Theoretical framework
Hoskin (2015) points out that the ‘“socio-political-economic-level” issue of “corruption prevention”’ (p. 4) is inseparable
rom the problem of the construction of an ethical subject at the individual level. Accordingly, this paper suggests that when
eveloping anti-corruption strategies, two intertwined questions should be considered. One question, as formulated by
opper, concerns the institutional mechanisms that deﬁne the structural dimension of corruption: ‘How can we so organize
olitical institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?’ (Popper, 1966, p. 121).
he second Platonic question focuses on the individual dimension: Who  should rule? (Plato, The Republic).
In order to explain the implications of these questions for the determination of anti-corruption strategies, we can rely
n the Rousseauian conceptualization of corruption and the theoretical insights provided by Kant and Popper on ethics and
emocracy. Rousseau’s theory of the state helps us to better understand the phenomenon of corruption by showing how it
s strongly related to the political processes that have led to the state’s institution and to the ethical principles that are the
onditions for the state’s preservation.
In his work ‘The Social Contract’ (1762), Rousseau provides a normative version of the so-called social contract theory, a
olitical theory that goes back to Plato and has been extended and reformulated in the work of philosophers such as Hobbes,
ocke and Rawls. This theory addresses the question of the legitimacy of the state’s authority and the origin of society by
rguing that individuals’ political and moral obligations are dependent upon an initial agreement (or contract) designed to
stablish the terms of the society in which they live.
According to this theory, the state is a moral community. The social contract establishes the ontological superiority
f the community over the individual, and ‘this act of association instantly replaces the individual person status of each
ontracting party by a moral and collective body’ (Social Contract I: 6; emphasis added). It establishes an equality in the
orm of distributive justice among individuals that otherwise cannot be found in nature alone (Kateb, 1961; Mulgan, 1979).
y entering into the social contract, individuals become citizens and establish a moral and collective body (state or sovereign)
s an expression of the so-called ‘general will’ (Social Contract II: 3).
According to Rousseau, the general will differs from both the particular will and the will of all. This is especially clear
hen he says, ‘The will of all is very different from the general will; the latter looks only to the common interest, while
he former looks to private interest and is no more than a sum of particular wills’ (Social Contract II: 3). The establishment
f the general will implies both a sacriﬁce and a change; the individual, through the social contract, ceases to be a single
ndividual and becomes a citizen as part of a community, thus sacriﬁcing his purely individualistic and utilitarian concerns.
urthermore, as interpreted by Kant, it requires that the lawmakers promulgate the laws ‘in such a way  that they could have
risen from the united will of an entire people’ (Kant, 1785, VI: 380f). Therefore, the respect of the ‘general will’ (Rousseau,
762) is ‘the touchstone of the legitimacy of every public enactment’ (Kant, 1785, VI: 380f).
To be part of a moral community implies a shared conception of the common good, in the sense that ‘what is good for
e has to be good for someone who inhabits these roles. I inherit from the past of my  family, my  city, my  tribe, my  nation
 variety of debts, inheritances, expectations and obligations’ (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 220). The identity of the individual is
mbedded in the community to which he or she belongs, and so are his or her political and moral obligations.
Within this framework, corruption appears as a moral degeneration of both the state and the individual as an illegitimate
xercise of power. Corruption occurs whenever:Please cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
. . . the prince came to have a particular will more active than the sovereign’s, and employed the public force in his
hands in obedience to this particular will [. . .]  when the meanest interest brazenly helps itself to the sacred name of
‘public good’, when the general will falls silent [. . .]  and wicked decrees directed solely to private interest get passed
off as ‘laws’. (Social Contract, III: 1)
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In this respect, Rousseau warns the citizens against the danger inherent in any form of political representation: the
representatives may  attempt to usurp the power that belongs only to the sovereign. Hence, Rousseau’s normative theory
recognizes a strong and direct form of democracy as the only mean to ensure the success of the social contract.
It therefore follows that where a mechanism of political representation exists, the preservation of the state is possible
only when the sovereign people exercise some measure of control over the conduct of their rulers in order to ensure
compliance with the social contract. As Popper (1966) suggested, an urgent question to ask in a representative democracy is
the following: ‘How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too
much damage?’ (Popper, 1966, p. 121). The sovereign’s power of control therefore becomes the last bastion of democracy:
Democracy, the right of the people to judge and to dismiss their government, is the only known device by which we
can try to protect ourselves against the misuse of political power; it is the control of the rulers by the ruled. (Popper,
1966, p. 335).
The legitimacy of the executive power originates from the sovereign’s capacity to limit it, modify it or take it back just
as it wishes. It implies the accountability of rulers to the state and the sovereign, where by accountability we  mean ‘the
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct,
the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may  face important consequences’ (Bovens, 2010, p. 951).
This accountability that ties the community to the government is a ‘public accountability’, where the term ‘public’ refers to
the public sector so that the account is accessible to the citizens (Bovens, 2005). As highlighted by Bovens (2005), ‘public
accountability is not just the hallmark of democratic governance; it is also a sine qua non for democratic governance’ (p. 192).
We therefore suggest that corruption can ﬂourish where these institutional arrangements do not operate properly, and it
can become even worse where they are absent.
However, in order to understand the nature and the contents of this form of public accountability, the second theoretical
question must be addressed: Who  should rule? This question embraces an anthropology different from that of the agency
theory underlining the previous one, as it assumes that each individual is a moral agent capable of acting in accordance with
the demands of the moral law (Kant, 1785). Based on this perspective, public accountability involves the moral behaviour
and ethics of the actors involved, and the legitimacy of political power ultimately rests on the citizens’ abilities to censure
unethical practices and wrong doings. Neither transparency nor the empowerment of civil society may  be effective in a
context where the notions of ‘public good’ and ‘private interest’ are devoid of meaning and absent in the cognitive schemas
and value systems of the citizenship.
For Rousseau, morality is inseparable from politics, since ‘all legitimate political obligations are in the last analysis moral
obligations’ (Noone, 1970, p. 4). The obligations of the rulers towards their citizens are moral and not simply legal. As Bovens
(2010) clariﬁes, ‘being accountable’ is also ‘a virtue, a positive quality of organizations or ofﬁcials’ (p. 947) Accordingly, to
give an account implies transforming ‘one’s efforts and exertions into a power that is subject to ethical evaluation’ (Shearer,
2002, p. 544). Corruption therefore arises as a social phenomenon insofar as it concerns not just the individual but also the
citizens as part of a moral community. In the words of MacIntyre (2007), ‘I can only answer the question “What am I to
do?” if I can answer the prior question “Of what story or stories do I ﬁnd myself a part?”’ (p. 216). In this respect, corruption
consists in the lack of recognition of mutual duty and in a loss of a particular kind of autonomy.
The concept of autonomy developed by Rousseau is the same as the one that we can ﬁnd in the work of Kant (Kateb,
1961). Both describe autonomy (from the Greek “óς” = self and óоς = law) as freedom or moral liberty (Cassirer, 1991),
where freedom means acting according to a law that individuals have ascribed upon themselves: ‘Autonomy of the will is
the property of the will through which it is a law to itself (independently of all properties of the objects of volition)’ (Kant,
1785, G 4:440). Furthermore, Kant links the moral law and autonomy in contrast to heteronomy, the subjection of the will
to some outside inﬂuence (e.g., natural impulses or inclinations) or to a consequentialist logic. Moral agency expresses the
positive freedom of an individual whose will is self-determined and hence autonomous. However, this defence of autonomy
does not result in a ‘social atomism’ (Wolgast, 1994, p. 1), but on the contrary, it helps to deﬁne the true conception of the
‘social bond’ (lien social), where ‘such a bond must bind together freely acting persons, not dead things. Hence it cannot be
something imposed upon the wills of these persons from without; they must constitute and create it themselves’ (Cassirer,
1991, p. 31).
The Rousseauian concepts of autonomy and moral laws coincide with obedience to the general will; the individual, ‘while
uniting himself with all, still obeys only himself and remains as free as before’ (Social Contract, I: 6), ‘the general will being
their will’ (Social Contract, VI: 2). The will of an autonomous moral agent is both self-legislating and self-constraining, as
the agent freely decides to be subject to the law that safeguards the public interest. It follows that it is in the obedience to
laws that the citizens and public servants ﬁnd their moral liberty and autonomy. The concept of autonomy is founded on the
connection between the common good and obedience to the law, and the implication of this concept is twofold. First, the
legitimacy of the law depends on it being an expression of the general will and on its effectiveness in enhancing the common
good; otherwise, it becomes corrupt. Second, a citizen is corrupt when his will, losing its moral freedom, is determined by
particular and individual purposes that conﬂict with the common good and laws. Hence, a public servant is autonomousPlease cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
whenever his behaviour conforms to the needs of the moral community to which he belongs. This moral drift facilitates the
growth of corrupt networks. On this point, Rousseau warns against the possibility that public ofﬁcials confuse the general
will with a ‘pseudo general will’. Although the ‘“individual will” supplants “the communal self” in a corrupted person, these
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small societies” will act as sort of a pseudo “general will” for the individual. [. . .]  At this point the loyalty has been narrowed
o the concerns of the faction, not the common good’ (Dobel, 1978, pp. 964–965).
In connecting this theory to the anti-corruption debate, it follows that a prominent role should be given to the active
articipation of civil society—as it is in a direct democracy—in the evaluation of public programmes and in denouncing abuses
f power, irregularities in the administration and corrupt practices. For example, the development of effective whistleblowing
rogrammes and the enforcement of mechanisms that enable people to censure unethical practices may  be a step forward
n the right direction towards rectifying these problems. This approach that Everett et al. (2006) have termed ‘the voice
olution’ (p. 6) has demonstrated positive results in countries such as Indonesia, Georgia and Colombia where, in addition to
nti-corruption laws and integrity programmes, the ‘popular mobilization against corruption’ (Agere, 2000, p. 17) through
he empowerment of outside agencies, NGOs and civil society has contributed to reduction of corruption (Klitgaard, 2014).
Three conditions are essential for this sort of model to be realized: (1) a simpliﬁcation of the rules, (2) public access to
nformation and (3) a sense of the state and appropriate civic behaviour. The latter requires that the virtue of autonomy
hould be possessed by public ofﬁcials and citizens and have room to be cultivated and protected. In the context of public
rocurement, for example, it is crucial that public ofﬁcials exercise their discretionary powers in the bidding process to serve
he public interest (the general will). Anti-corruption measures such as the uniform, systemic and independent veriﬁcation of
onﬂicts of interest involving public ofﬁcials and the requirement of transparency in asset declarations, public appointment
rocesses and political party funding are measures that may  enhance the autonomy of public ofﬁcials. However, discretionary
owers are sometimes unavoidable and at other times beneﬁcial (e.g., it is not always the case in public tenders that the
hoice of the lowest bid responds best to the public needs), and the ‘goodness’ of the process ultimately rests on the ethics
f the individuals involved.
. Methodology
Our analysis empirically investigates the complex social phenomenon of corruption in order to translate the above
heoretical explanations into practical insights.
In order to determine the most appropriate research methodology, we  needed to consider the phenomenon to be analyzed,
ere corruption, more carefully. Our main assumption prior to further investigation was  the following: corruption is nothing
ther than a practical problem of our society. As researchers approaching the phenomenon of corruption, we  needed to start
rom our empirical and contingent experience of it. Our focus, then, was  on praxis ( ˜ς).
Accordingly, we relied on case analysis research as the most valuable tool to investigate this complex phenomenon within
ts real-life context (Cooper & Morgan, 2008; Yin, 2003). Quantitative methods have been adopted extensively when inves-
igating corruption, but the translation of corruption into such variables ‘draws attention away from the corrupt practices
nd the corrupt agent’ (De Graaf, 2007, p. 41). Furthermore, there are not many studies on real life cases of corruption and,
ence, more contingent and contextual research is needed (De Graaf, 2007). Case studies on corruption may  also become
aluable tools in teaching, as they help students to better understand the speciﬁcally human dynamics involved in corruption
Klitgaard, 1984).
This paper, therefore, focuses on a speciﬁc episode of corruption and attempts to describe the features of the corrupt
ractices in place in a speciﬁc context. In so doing, we  acknowledge the ‘primacy of context’ (Flyvbjerg, 2004, p. 19), ‘the
riority of the particular’ (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 37), and the ‘force of example’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006b, p. 228).
In terms of scientiﬁc validity, this ‘bottom-up form of analysis’ (Hoskin, 2015, p. 8) may  lead to the conclusion that it is
mpossible to generalize from a single case. Relying on the Popperian scientiﬁc paradigm, Flyvbjerg (2004) concludes, ‘the
ase study is ideal for generalizing using the type of test [. . .]  called falsiﬁcation’ (p. 227). Our analysis contributes to this
ngoing debate by suggesting that the main purpose of case study research is not to generalize, but instead to enhance a
articular science for applied thought through the exercise of a practical reasoning.
Developing this type of practical approach involves providing a case analysis that sheds light on the behaviours and
alues of the actors involved by framing what Flyvbjerg (2004) has deﬁned as ‘situational ethics’ (p. 11). The latter require
bservation of both the moral will and the moral skill of the actors. In other words, ‘People with practical wisdom have the
oral will to do the right thing and the moral skill to ﬁgure out what the right thing is in any particular situation’ (Schwartz,
011, p. 3). Therefore, our analysis investigated how corruption occurs in the present by providing a relative perspective, and
he ﬁnal goal was not to generalize from a speciﬁc episode, but instead to effectively describe a praxis in order to produce a
practical truth’.
Indeed, practical knowledge is contingent and consequently it can be obtained only by discovering what is practically
rue, or ‘a truth created by action’ (Anscombe, 1999). As Flyvbjerg (2006b, p. 238) explains, ‘The case study is itself the result
 . . the narrative itself is the answer’. The production of practical truth implies the contextualization of the assumptions
hat underline the theoretical framework described above. In other words, ‘To restore to practice its practical truth, we
ust therefore reintroduce time into the theoretical representation of a practice which, being temporally structured, is
ntrinsically deﬁned by its tempo’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 8).Please cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
Therefore, the description of the case allows for further exploration of the relationship between the public ofﬁcials’
orrupt behaviour and the mechanisms of public procurement that deﬁne their space of action and power in a speciﬁc time.
n addition, the production of practical truth has an important implication for what the mission of research should be. As
arx once said, ‘All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mystics, ﬁnd their rational solution
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in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice’ (Marx, 1845, VIII). In accordance with this view, the case study
developed here attempts to ‘articulate and explore the conﬂicts about values, interests, and the operation of power’ (Cooper
& Morgan, 2008, p. 164).
The ultimate goal of our case description was  to comprehend and analyze the practice of corruption in the hopes that this
could lead to practical solutions. By doing so, this article contributes to phronetic organization research (Everett & Tremblay,
2014; Flyvbjerg, 2006a) that has its foundations in the Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom.
To convey the complexity of the phenomenon, we  drew from many sources of data, including judicial documents, govern-
ment records, and newspapers articles. The aim of the analysis was  not to reconstruct a complete, exhaustive, and objective
description, but to develop an interpretative understanding of the corrupt practices in their individual and structural
dimensions, letting the case unfold into other fruitful insights (Flyvbjerg, 2006b).
4. Corruption and anti-corruption strategies in Italy
As emphasized by Della Porta and Vannucci (1999), ‘the Italian case can [. . .]  be considered as a sort of magnifying glass
for the analysis of more general patterns of corruption in democratic systems’ (p. 13). When it comes to perceived levels of
corruption, Italy ranks in 61st place together with countries such as Senegal, South Africa and Montenegro (Transparency
International, 2015), and second to last in the rank of EU countries, followed only by Bulgaria. Similarly, the World Bank’s
Control of Corruption Index (2013) places Italy at the bottom of European rankings. According to the 2015 Eurobarometer,
98% of respondent companies in Italy say that corruption is widespread in their country, compared to 11% of those in Denmark
(see Fig. 1). In particular, 76% of respondents believe corruption in public procurement as managed by national authorities
is widespread (see Fig. 2). Overall, the Italian culture emerges as ‘alienated, fragmented and particularistic, with low trust
in politics and public administration’ (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2005, p. 6).
However, despite these numbers, the Italian judicial statistics indicate a downward trend in the number of people con-
victed for corruption from 749 in 2007 to 458 in 2011 (ANAC, 2013). These data suggest an inverse relationship between the
corruption practised and the corruption reported and punished (Ministry of Interior, 2012).
In 1992, the Bribesville (Tangentopoli) scandal did not seem to function as a trigger for radical change, as was expected
(Barbacetto, Gomez, & Travaglio, 2012; Sargiacomo et al., 2015; Vannucci, 2009). In the aftermath of the scandal, sev-
eral corruption-enhancing measures were proposed instead (Law n. 367/2001; Law n. 248/2002; Law n. 140/2003; Law n.
241/2006; Law 124/2008). Hence, some critical facilitators for corruption remained in place, including the following: (1)
an ineffective time limit in the statute of limitation, (2) a lack of a clear and enforceable conﬂict of interest standards, (3)
difﬁculty in accessing public information, (4) a general lack of transparency, (4) a lack of effective codes of conduct and (5)
the complexity and fragmentation of the legal framework (GRECO, 2008; Transparency International, 2011b). Furthermore,
from 2003 to 2014, three different anti-corruption authorities were appointed and their lack of authority and independence,
excessive bureaucratization, and lack of resources and powers jeopardized the effectiveness of the corruption control mea-Please cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
sures (ANAC, 2014; GRECO, 2008; L’Espresso, 2008; OECD, 2013a). Law 190/2012 (the so-called ‘Severino’s law’) and the
recent Law 69/2015 seem to address many of the criticalities highlighted above (e.g., by increasing the statute of limitations
and empowering anti-corruption authorities), but corruption still appears to be widespread, as the recent Expo 2015 and
Maﬁa Capitale scandals seem to conﬁrm.
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With respect to public procurement, several measures have been adopted to enhance the transparency and efﬁciency of
hese processes (Legislative Decree 163/2006; Law n. 136/2010; Law 190/2012), such as the establishment of centralized
urchasing bodies, the obligation on prefects to compile ‘white lists’ of economic operators and the development of e-
rocurement mechanisms. Nevertheless, for large public works alone, corruption (including indirect losses) is estimated
o amount to as much as 40% of total public procurement value (EU Anti-Corruption Report, 2014a). Among the reasons
or these numbers, there is the impossibility for the Court of Audit to carry out checks during the process without advance
arning, and the consistent use of negotiated procedures, in particular without publication of contract notices (in 2010, such
ases accounted for 14% of value of contracts, compared to the 6% of the European average) (EU Anti-Corruption Report,
014a). As a result, despite these attempts to address corruption, ‘reducing corruption and improving trust must remain a
riority’ in Italy (OECD, 2015, p. 4).
. An Italian case study
The analysis of an Italian case study allows us to investigate the dangerous combination of democracy with high levels of
orruption that characterizes this speciﬁc setting (Colazingari & Rose-Ackerman, 1998). We  focus here on a speciﬁc episode
f corruption in public procurement. The case analyzed is a speciﬁc episode within a broader corruption scandal, the ‘G8  and
ig events scandal’ that dominated the national press in 2010 and had a signiﬁcant impact on public opinion. The scandal
nvolved a broad range of actors, including business people, politicians and public ofﬁcials, and it was generally considered
o be one of the biggest Italian scandals after the Bribesville scandal of the early 1990s. Due to the complexity and dimension
f the scandal, one paper cannot be expected to cover the totality of the issues involved. To complicate things even further,
he judicial process is still ongoing, so there are risks with respect to maintaining the accuracy of the narrative. Therefore, we
ave chosen to focus only on a speciﬁc episode of this scandal: the ﬁrst episode that triggered the entire court proceedings
nd the only one for which convictions have been obtained (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2016).
It should be noted that the selected case encompasses all of the elements that allow corruption to occur and ﬂourish
n the Italian context. In addition, it is particularly interesting because it conﬁrms the permeability of public procurement
o corruption (Neu et al., 2015) and sheds light on the ethical issues raised by inter-organizational relationships (Osborne,
010). Furthermore, this speciﬁc case shows the limitations of both the legalistic and the neoliberal approaches to corruption.
In a decision delivered on 31 October 2012, the Court of Rome returned a guilty verdict, according to which two  public
fﬁcials, Angelo Balducci and Fabio De Sanctis, had sold their political inﬂuence to Riccardo Fusi and Roberto Bartolomei,
anagers of the Italian company Baldassini Tognozzi Pontelli (BTP), in exchange for private beneﬁts. The issue at stake was
he contract for the construction of a police academy in Florence, and other contracts for costly public works such as the
uilding tenders of so-called ‘big events’ (the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Italian uniﬁcation and the G8 Summit).
The legal inquiry into the case began in 2007, while the press only discovered it in 2010. Only in 2016 was  a ﬁnal verdict
eached in court (see Table 1 for a synthesis of the milestones of the case). The starting point of the inquiry involved the
nearthing of some conversations between Vincenzo Di Nardo, CEO of BTP, and some of his colleagues and friends. BTP hadPlease cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
ust lost three contract bids for major infrastructural works related to the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Italian
niﬁcation: (1) the construction of the Florence Music and Culture Park, (2) the realization of the Cinema Palace at the Venice
ido, and (3) the completion of the Perugia-Sant’Egidio International Airport.
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Table 1
Case timeline.
The legal pathway The pactum sceleris’ milestones
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport awards the contract
for the police academy (Florence) to BTP.
9/28/2001
10 days after entering the construction site, BTP asks for
adjustment of the seismic coefﬁcient to higher levels (from 〈1〉 to
〈1.4〉),  while denouncing the necessity of changing the initial
project. It is the start of a long controversy with the Ministry.
4/2/2004
BTP asks for an arbitration award. 3–4/10/2005
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport reassigns the contract
to  the rival company Ansaldi as a result of breach of contract.
03/2006
BTP obtains the beneﬁt of the arbitration award and EUR
34,410,061 in compensation from the Ministry.
7/27/2007
The attorney general asks the superior court in Rome for
suspension of the enforceability of the arbitration award.
11/6/2007
1/23/2008 Rome. First meeting between Di Nardo, De Vito Piscicelli, and
De Sanctis.
2/1/2008 Rome. Meeting between Fusi, Di Nardo, De Vito Piscicelli,
Balducci, and De Sanctis.
2/13/2008 Rome. Meeting between Fusi, Bartolomei, De Vito Piscicelli,
Balducci, and De Sanctis:
Discussion about the possibility of reassigning the Police
academy contract to BTP.
Fusi and Bartolomei are invited to express their preferences on
contracts that are going to be awarded for the celebration of
the 150th anniversary of Italian uniﬁcation.
2/18/2008 Florence. Meeting between Fusi and De Vito Piscicelli. De Vito
Piscicelli proposes the pactum sceleris to Fusi: the public
ofﬁcials promise to award contracts to BTP concerning the
works for two “big events” and to reassign to BTP the contract
for the Police academy in exchange of money and other
utilities.
Balducci resigns from the ofﬁce as head of the Test Committee for
the  Police academy.
3/7/2008
7/30/2008 The politician Denis Verdini gets in contact with Balducci
thanks to the intermediation of Fusi. Verdini exercises his
political inﬂuence over the party colleague Matteo Matteoli,
Minister of Infrastructure and Transport.
Balducci is appointed as chairman of the Board of Public Works. 10/10/2008
The Minister Matteoli promotes De Sanctis as special
commissioner of a Commission for the Resolution of the Police
academy controversy.
12/2008
De Sanctis is appointed as Administrator of Public Works in the
regions of Tuscany, Umbria and Marche.
01/2009
Transfer of powers and duties from the Ministry of infrastructure
and Transport to the Administrator of Public Works in the
Tuscany region (De Sanctis).
02/2009The company Astaldi receives the order to stop the works in the
construction site.
10/4/2009
Source: Own elaboration.
Di Nardo seemed sure that Angelo Balducci, the head of the Department for the Development and Competitiveness of
Tourism, had manipulated all of the bid selection processes:
I realized that there is a kind of lobby group of Roman people living in the Ministries. [. . .]  They are bandits . . . sooner
or later the newspapers will report that they have been caught with a bribe in hand. . . (pre-trial detention order, p.
78).
These are violent people [. . .]  I didn’t know this team of Balducci . . . this is a task force, cohesive, solid . . . they are
bulldozers (pre-trial detention order, p. 326)
At the end of 2007, Fusi, a patron of BTP, had become aware that he was involved in an environment in which other
entrepreneurs illicitly inﬂuenced the main decision-makers of the state. He later explained to the judges, ‘The law of 2006
gave enormous discretionary powers [. . .]  Balducci understood this mechanism and he was the man  more courted and
revered in Italy’ (Imarisio, 2010). The Public Procurement Code of 2006 (Legislative Decree n. 163/2006) established that
public contracts may  be awarded on the basis of either the lowest price or the economically most advantageous (valuePlease cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
for money), therefore providing the contracting authority with wide discretionary power on public procurement. The same
year, Law 286/2006 instituted the Department for the Development and Competitiveness of Tourism at the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers. Speciﬁcally, the Department was  in charge of managing the bidding processes for so-called big events.
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Before 2001, the notion a ‘big event’ referred only to extraordinary events such as natural disasters that required the
nstitution of a state of emergency. Law 401/2001 extended this notion to other types of events. In 23 November 2007, a
ecree of the President of the Council of Ministers declared the complex of works related to the celebration of the 150th
nniversary of Italian uniﬁcation to be a ‘big event’. In September of the same year, the G8 Summit had also been declared a ‘big
vent’. Such declaration is important because it involves the institution of a state of emergency and implies the application
f a special regulation. Brieﬂy, this regulation establishes a concentration of power in the hands of the Presidency of the
ouncil of Ministers, with more ﬂexible rules of procedure notwithstanding the current regulations in addition to diminished
nancial restrictions.
In 2007, a Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers established a ‘Structure of Mission’ at the Department for
he Development and Competitiveness of Tourism for the organization of the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Italian
niﬁcation. The President of the Council of Ministers designated Angelo Balducci as head of the Structure and the public
fﬁcial Fabio De Sanctis as a delegate commissioner (pre-trial detention order, pp. 70–71). In this new context, the two
ublic ofﬁcials had so much power concentrated in their hands that they were deﬁned by De Sanctis as having a ‘license to
ill’. According to De Sanctis, ‘We  can say . . . how to say . . . we have a license to kill . . . we  can grab all we  want’ (July 01,
008; pre-trial detention order, p. 4).
At that time, the major concern for BTP management was  the reassignment of the contract for the building of the police
cademy in Florence. In 2001, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport awarded the contract for this work to BTP.
owever, in 2006, the contract was reassigned to the rival company Ansaldi as result of a breach of contract. In response,
he management of BTP decided to bring a lawsuit against the Ministry in order to get back the contract. In September 2007,
TP obtained the beneﬁt of an arbitration award, but the latter did not establish the right of BTP to regain the contract. On 3
ctober 2007, the Ministry impugned the arbitration award. At the end of the year, BTP management decided to undertake
llegal action to reverse the situation in favour of BTP. The only possible way to do this would have been to access the network
ystem of public procurement managed by Angelo Balducci (La Repubblica, 2013).
The key actor who made this possible was Francesco Maria De Vito Piscicelli, a small businessperson with many useful
elationships in the palaces of power in Rome, and a long-standing relationship with the two public ofﬁcials. In order to take
dvantage of his political connections, Fusi decided to start a business relationship with the Opere pubbliche e ambiente
.p.a. (Public Infrastructure and Environment), the small economically devastated company managed by De Vito Piscicelli.
olicited by Di Nardo, De Vito Piscicelli organized many meetings between the public ofﬁcials, Fusi and Bartolomei. Beginning
n 23 January 2008, these actors met  each other many times. On the ﬁrst of February 2008, a pactum sceleris was ﬁnally
igned (pre-trial detention order). The object of the corrupt exchange was  the following: the public ofﬁcials promised to
ward BTP the contracts concerning two ‘big events’ (the 150th Anniversary and the G8 Summit) and to reassign the contract
or the police academy to BTP in exchange for money and other utilities.
Although Fusi already had two lawyers working on the issue of the police academy, the public ofﬁcials provided him with
heir own lawyer, Guido Cerruti, ‘as if it was not important if he worked for the public administration or for the interests
f the private [provider]’ (the verdict document, p. 50). In so doing, the two public ofﬁcials decided to take the part of the
rivate provider in the arbitration that was opposing BTP against the public administration. It soon became clear that the
ribe was part of the money given to Cerruti as ‘payment’ for legal counsel. The pactum sceleris was to involve not only an
xchange of money, but also the distribution of other utilities. Indeed, Fusi was aware that the reassignment of the police
cademy contract depended on the concentration of power in the hands of the public ofﬁcials.
At that time, Balducci was the head of the Test Committee for the police academy, but he and De Sanctis did not have
ny decision power over the contract for the academy. However, thanks to a deep network of relationships, the two  public
fﬁcials soon succeeded in obtaining power to manage the awarding of the contract. Fusi provided the two public ofﬁcials
ith the political protection of a powerful, reliable friend and business partner, the politician Denis Verdini, coordinator of
he government’s political party (Corriere della sera, 2016). Verdini could then exercise his political inﬂuence over party
olleague Matteo Matteoli, Minister of Infrastructure and Transport.
In 2009, as result of this sphere of political inﬂuence, the public ofﬁcial De Sanctis was promoted to the position of admin-
strator of public works in the regions of Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche, despite his not having the necessary professional
ualiﬁcations. At the same time, the Minister of Infrastructure and Transport promoted Balducci to be chairman of the Board
f Public Works. It was soon clear that these promotions were made to resolve the issue of the police academy in favour of
TP. In fact, thanks to the commitment of Balducci in his new role, in February 2009 De Sanctis won the responsibility of
anaging the police academy’s contract that had been transferred from the Minister of Infrastructure and Transport to the
gency of Public Works, now chaired by him.
Between April and October 2009, all of the terms and agreements of the pactum sceleris were set to be accomplished;
staldi received the order to stop work on the construction site, and complex administrative machinery was  set up to allow
or the reassignment of the contract to BTP. Suddenly, however, the judiciary intervened.
. DiscussionPlease cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
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This case shows how the lack of public control over government practices and the lack of autonomy of public ofﬁcials
stablishes an ‘accountability gap’. Several elements were aligned in order to facilitate the occurrence of corruption: (1) the
oncentration of unlimited discretionary power in the hands of a few people, (2) the lack of transparency in the appointment
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of public ofﬁcials, (3) the collusion between controllers and the controlled, (4) the complexity of the legal process, (5) the
length of judicial proceedings and (6) the lack of a sense of the state and appropriate civic behaviour.
The complexity of the normative framework allowed for the two  public ofﬁcials, Balducci and De Sanctis, to act ‘behind the
lines’, thus allowing for the concentration of enormous discretionary powers over public procurement in their hands without
being subject to any authoritative control, neither that of civil society nor that of the judiciary. Balducci and De Sanctis were
in charge of identifying the providers to which they ought to award the contracts, and they could select any necessary
professional and determine the procedural measures. Quite simply, ‘Balducci had carte blanche to use his companies . . . to
use what he wanted and, in practice, to avoid the public tender’ (words of the architect Casamonti, pre-trial detention order,
p. 326). Furthermore, the way in which the political inﬂuence of Verdini affected the appointment processes of Balducci and
De Sanctis (the latter elected without having the necessary professional qualiﬁcations) shows a lack of transparency and
meritocracy in the selection of public ofﬁcials.
This great and pervasive power free from accountability was  very much a source of corruption in this case. As noticed by
Roberts (2015), the attraction of corruption consists in the exercise of a quasi-sovereign power within hierarchy. This power
is the sovereign power of the community and the illegitimate appropriation of this power by public servants indicates a lack
of democratic accountability as deﬁned by our theoretical framework.
The production of derogations from conventional norms coexisted with stringent anti-corruption rules and controls
(Sargiacomo et al., 2015). However, the discretionary power exercised by the actors allowed them to bypass these rules
in the name of simpliﬁcation and emergency. In this respect, the actors deployed the complexity of the rules and the
red tape as a justiﬁcation for acting against the current regulations. Interestingly, Fusi used the same argument: the red
tape would have (and actually had) slowed down the judicial process, hence the illegal way was  the fastest way to obtain
what he believed was rightfully his. This consideration shows how a fragmented and excessively complex legal frame-
work can create the conditions for the moral justiﬁcation of wrongdoing. The public ofﬁcials made instrumental use
of the laws, which become tools for transforming otherwise illegal and unethical behaviours into legitimate practices.
In other words, in such a process, ‘ﬁrst, they consider the needs of the private briber and then they make a search for
technical-juridical considerations to satisfy the interests of the private actor’ (the verdict document, p. 83). It is precisely
the actors’ knowledge of the rules and procedures of power that allows them to construct a corrupt network (Roberts,
2015).
In a system where democratic control is weakened through a long chain of delegations, public ofﬁcials are not forced
to account for violations of the social contract, and neither are the business actors (Papadopoulos, 2007). Consequently,
such violations become widespread practice among the procurement actors (bureaucrats, politicians, and entrepreneurs)
that can advantage from them. In such a situation, the contract of corruption gradually takes the place of the original social
contract. The corrupt rules obtain legitimization through the progressive adhesion of the actors to the ‘prevailing models
of behaviour’ (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2005, p. 16). In 13 June 2010, in an interview for a national newspaper, Fusi stated,
‘I am a victim of a general behaviour. In Italy, the system of public procurement works in this way, everybody knows this.
It is well known and accepted by all the participants. . .’  (Imarisio, 2010). As explained by Neu et al. (2015), ‘procurement
participants [. . .]  are also very much subjected to and constructed as subjects by their own  practices and the practices of
others’ (p. 11).
In the Italian context, the ‘moral cost of corruption’ (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2005, p. 14) is very low, as there does not
seem to exist a value system that holds corruption to blame. Hence, corruption occurs not as a single isolated episode, but
as the expression of a broader, complex, and holistic situation. It becomes a normal modus operandi, where ‘wide, pronged
and unfair advantages are pursued, and an illicit relationship is strengthened along the time implying the engagement in
every future and next contract’ (Corriere Fiorentino, 2010).
In this respect, there was a meaningful conversation between two  architects, Marco Casamonti and Paolo Desideri, who
were involved in the bidding process for the 150th anniversary of Italian uniﬁcation:
Casamonti: Italy is a country where, actually, things do not go in the right way  . . . this is a general condition . . . today is
my turn, tomorrow is yours . . . things do not go in the right way because the interference of politics assumes shameful
tones that . . . in my  opinion . . . fall outside quality . . . and, second, because the management of the Ministry of Public
Works is not so transparent [. . .]
Desideri: [. . .]  there is no doubt that the companies refer to an incubator for the acceptance of their candidacy . . . it
is not the incubator within which we operate that is cultural [. . .]
Casamonti: [. . .]  there is a system in the Ministry of Public Works . . . that in my opinion it is almost a scandal. . .
Desideri: [. . .]  they are immersed in a gelatinous system. . . (pre-trial detention order, p. 326).
The most dangerous implication of this ‘gelatinous system’ is the actors’ perception that it is impossible to act outside of
it. The market so created has high barriers to entry and exit (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2005). The exclusion from this system
implies the impossibility for social actors to participate in an ethical economic life, since ‘. . .it is a race to gain the favours of
the public ofﬁcials who can decide your life’ (words of Fusi, Imarisio, 2010).Please cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
The private and public spheres overlap, thus becoming almost indistinguishable. The loyalty to the common good is
sacriﬁced in the name of the mutual beneﬁts that the pactum sceleris would bring to all of the contractors. The eco-
nomic obligations to the participants of the corrupt network replace the social obligations to the community. The bidding
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rocesses are conducted not by looking at the common good (expressed through the general will), but by considering
he private interest of a few people (e.g., the interest of BTP to regain the contract and the utilities gained by the two
ublic ofﬁcials). As a result, the law itself becomes corrupted and there is a dangerous relegation of the general will to
 ‘pseudo general will’. In this speciﬁc case, the Legislative Decree n. 163/2006 and several other decrees on big events,
ather than enhancing the autonomy of the public ofﬁcials (as was  maybe the genuine intent of the law), allowed them
o use the conferred discretionary powers to pursue their own interests while at the same time ‘respecting’ all of the
ules.
The events described suggest a radical loss of identity and autonomy among the public administration (the verdict
ocument, p. 23). Indeed, the public ofﬁcials seem to be acting in the grip of interests that are sometimes indistinguishable
rom those of the private corrupters. On this point, the press reported an ‘emblematic phone call between the controller De
anctis and the controlled Fusi. The latter congratulates De Sanctis for his promotion; De Sanctis thanks him. And concludes:
I am working for you although it is the 31st of December”’ (La Stampa, 2010).
This conversation dramatically reveals how the logic of competition and private proﬁt was permeating public admin-
stration fusing its mission with the interests of the private suppliers. The public ofﬁcials evaluated the ‘goodness’ of their
ctions based on whether these actions might provide utility for the corrupt network of participants. This privatization of
oral concerns also emerged where the decisions of the actors seemed to be guided by the considerations of public interest.
or example, the promotion of De Sanctis as administrator of public works in Tuscany, far from being conceived of as an
pportunity for enhancing the public interest, was a further expression of the enslavement of the two public ofﬁcials to the
nterests of Fusi and his company:
There is the possibility that I become . . . we can say the Administrator of Public Works in Florence . . . (laugh) . . . you
understand . . . the ﬁrst issue that we have to deal with will be for sure the Marshals. (De Sanctis to Fusi; pre-trial
detention order, p. 47)
Similarly, Balducci decided to resign as head of the Test Committee for the police academy because it was  beneﬁcial for
he development of solutions in favour of BTP. De Sanctis clearly expressed this point in a conversation with Fusi where he
ays, ‘Yes, yes . . . he (Balducci) will sign as soon as possible the resignation . . . tomorrow he is going to sign . . . understand?
. . .]  So I read it to you and I leave a seed . . . a very important seed . . .’  (pre-trial detention order, p. 116).
Furthermore, subsequent contract modiﬁcations related to the seismic coefﬁcient of the structures under construction
ere not evaluated in consideration of the public safety, but were instead viewed as an opportunity to inﬂate the costs of
he contract and gain more proﬁt:
He (De Sanctis) can also review and update the prices . . . this is not something that you can easily obtain . . . have you
got it? . . . he was neither thinking to ask for it . . . I do not know if I was clear enough. . . (De Vito Piscicelli to Gagliardi,
pre-trial detention order, p. 37)
As noted in the EU Anti-Corruption Report (2014a), sometimes ‘the public procurement process is proper, procedures
re respected, and winning bids indeed seem to be the most advantageous, but in contrast, the quality of deliverables is
ntentionally compromised in the execution phase’ (p. 12). Again, the formal correctness of the procedures is used as a device
or hiding corrupt practices. In all of these episodes, the particular and individual purposes that conﬂicted with the common
ood determined the will of the actors, regardless of (and despite) the legality of their actions.
This case shows that corruption is more about the conscience and ethics of the actors. In this respect, it is signiﬁcant
hat we ﬁnd the same actors operating in analogous episodes of the ‘G8 and big events scandal’. Consider, for example,
he following conversation between De Vito Piscicelli and his brother-in-law Gagliardi in the aftermath of the L’Aquila
arthquake:
Gagliardi: Stay on this earthquake thing down there [at the Ofﬁce of Public Works] because we’ve got to be ready to
start up quickly, there’s not an earthquake every day.
De Vito Piscicelli: I know (laughing).
Gagliardi: I’m just speaking for the sake of speaking . . . poor people, right?
De Vito Piscicelli: Yes sure . . . I was laughing in my  bed this morning at 3:30 [when the quake happened].
Gagliardi: Yes, so was I . . . Ok, bye.
This conversation shows that De Vito Piscicelli was  at the centre of a broader corrupt network that, expanding gradually,
ontinued to embrace new actors and new corrupt deals, and sadly including those concerning the resources devoted to
econstruction after the L’Aquila earthquake in 2009. Only by following the actors was  the judiciary able to unveil the plot
f corrupt networks.
In this corrupt environment, the engineer Benedetto Mercuri, the ofﬁcer responsible for tenders (RUP), raised some
oncerns about the pertinence of the decision made by De Sanctis in stopping the work:Please cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
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There, there are 350 workers that will be laid off . . . they stop the machineries . . . they stop the subcontractors . . . and
the plants that are producing the prefabricated components . . . with all the mess going on today . . . that people do
not have a job, do not have nothing [. . .]  Those are 350 workers . . . families [. . .]  I realize everything . . . the pressures
[. . .]  I do not want to do this work anymore . . . you must dismiss me.  (pp. 56–64, pre-trial detention order)
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Source: Own elaboration.
The quotation reveals an understanding of the common good that lay dormant in some of the public ofﬁcial’s consciences.
Despite his position as a subordinate in the hierarchy of power, Mercuri resists ‘the internalization of the desire of the
powerful’ (Roberts, 2015, p. 5) and tries to challenge the corrupt conduct of his superiors by calling for accountability.
Mercuri would be dismissed from his role, but soon the main actors of this history of ordinary corruption would be
required to account for their actions in front of the judiciary as well as in front of the citizens, the original contractors of the
broken social contract.
7. Conclusions
The case analyzed shows that corruption concerns the ethics of the individual and the capacity of society to unveil and
condemn corrupt behaviours. It concerns both the people’s virtue of recognizing corruption as an immoral behaviour and
hence condemning it, and their ‘capability’ (Sen, 1999, p. 75) to exercise their control on the actions of the rulers. These
aspects deﬁne the sphere of what we have deﬁned with the term ‘public accountability’.
In the Italian episode, the actors used the laws to hide corruption behind the formal correctness of the rules (e.g., Law
401/2001 on big events) and the complexity of the law legitimized rather than prevented recourse to alternative illegal
ways of action (Barbieri & Giavazzi, 2014). Furthermore, the episode conﬁrms that the overlapping role of the state as both
consumer and regulator can lead to situations where ‘politicians and bureaucrats are responsible for operationalizing the
very rules and regulations that will govern their subsequent behaviours’ (Sargiacomo et al., 2015, p. 7). The paradoxical result
is the contradictory role of the state that nourishes the corruption it should eradicate, and a government that is playing a
double role of controller and controlled. In this respect, the case of Italy offers an emblematic example among others of a
formal legal and democratic framework coupled with a widespread lack of accountability.
In addition, the practice of public procurement, invoked by the neoliberalists, facilitated the spread of corruption because
the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the agents involved made public control more complex (Soudry, 2007). A complicated
network of governance weakens the public accountability that links citizens to their political representatives by strengthen
the power of private actors through marketing practices. Bureaucrats take on the role of agents for politicians who in turn act
as agents for the electorate (Murray, 2009). This long chain of delegation transforms shared responsibilities between multiplePlease cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
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actors (private and public) into a diffused lack of responsibility by increasing ‘the number of actors who are involved in the
policy process without being democratically authorized ex ante, and without being subject to democratic control ex post’
(Papadopoulos, 2007, p. 476). As a result, the decision-making processes become opaque (Papadopoulos, 2007; Thompson,
1980), thus opening the way for corruption.
G Model
A
t
g
2
2
d
p
p
i
T
i
a
c
p
r
F
l
I
a
f
e
p
t
t
f
t
T
m
P
s
t
n
p
t
s
F
2
A
l
c
i
p
c
o
g
o
l
m
R
A
AARTICLE IN PRESSCCFOR-338; No. of Pages 16
G. Grossi, D. Pianezzi / Accounting Forum xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 13
In summary, the novelty of the corruption portrayed in our analysis consists in two  main characteristics. First, in response
o the shift from government to network governance, corruption itself becomes a network (or an expression of a ‘pseudo
eneral will’) that increasingly relies on the intermediation of business actors (e.g., De Vito Piscicelli) (Della Porta & Vannucci,
007; Neu et al., 2013) and uses the complexity and opacity of legislation and governance to its advantage (Sargiacomo et al.,
015). Corruption results in a loss of steering capacity (Graycar & Villa, 2011), and the inability of governance to enhance
emocratic control leads to even more corruption (Kotera, Okada, & Samreth, 2012). Hence, a neoliberal approach to the
roblem may  exacerbate rather than mitigate the corrupting effect of institutionalized relationships between private and
ublic actors in the public procurement context. Indeed, the private actors and the bureaucrats play an important part
n the process of delivering public services without being required to be accountable to the citizens (Crouch et al., 2000).
herefore, the traditional idea of political accountability is not functional anymore for democratic empowerment, and there
s a need to broaden the accountability process by giving voice to civil society and more power to the judiciary. This involves
 simpliﬁcation of the rules and more transparency.
The anti-corruption measures introduced by top performing countries such as New Zealand, Finland, and Sweden (e.g.,
omprehensive systems of e-governance) may  offer valuable insights in this respect. In Denmark, for example, political
arties devised an agreement called the ‘openness scheme’ that invites public servants to declare information such as gifts
eceived, monthly spending, and travel expenses (European Commission, 2014c; Transparency International, 2011a). In
inland, the Parliament’s website reports the notiﬁcations of interest (‘disclosure of outside ties’) that the Members of Par-
iament (MPs) are required to ﬁle at the beginning of each parliamentary term (European Commission, 2014e; Transparency
nternational, 2011a). In Sweden, the government provides extensive information on the details of its budget and ﬁnancial
ctivities during the budget process, therefore allowing citizens to exercise some control over the management of public
unds (European Commission, 2014d; Transparency International, 2011a, 2011b).
Second, new public corruption refers to the case of individuals lacking the virtue of autonomy who  are provided with
normous discretionary power (e.g., Balducci and De Sanctis). By focusing on the macro dimension of the phenomenon,
olicy makers and scholars risk neglecting the centrality of the Platonic question: Who  should rule? This question points to
he subject of corruption and to the necessity of ‘more inherently moral people’ (Everett et al., 2006, p. 7). In this respect, if
he case analyzed had contained clear and simple rules, the publicity of the appointment procedures could have ensured a
airer evaluation of the autonomy of the actors appointed.
Our analysis reveals the weakness of the legalistic/control approach. In other words, anti-corruption measures (such as
hose described above adopted by northern European countries) count for little if a culture of public ethics is not widespread.
he virtue of autonomy requires that public servants internalize the moral law of mutual duty and understand their role and
ission in the moral community. In this respect, the case of Denmark, at the top of Transparency International’s Corruption
erceptions Index (Transparency International, 2015), is emblematic of a case where, due to a ‘tradition of high ethical
tandards and transparency in public procedures, few formal rules regulating integrity and anti-corruption are in place in
he public administration’ (EU Anti-Corruption Report, 2014c, p. 3).
Overall, this paper conﬁrms the conclusions of previous critical accounting studies that have described ‘the “doubled”
ature of corruption in which processes designed to protect the public interest are mobilized by the corrupt for their private
urposes’ (Roberts, 2015, p. 2; Sargiacomo et al., 2015). In particular, the case offers an example of ‘the use of the law
o evade the law’ (Hoskin, 2015, p. 2) and points to the weakness of anti-corruption assemblages in contexts where the
upply-side of corruption fall outside of the public’s control (Sikka & Lehman, 2015), as is the case with public procurement.
urthermore, our research adds to those studies that have examined anti-corruption discourses and strategies (Everett et al.,
006; Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2007) by showing the limitations of the legalistic and neoliberal approaches to corruption.
long with Johnston (2015), we therefore stress the need of involving civil society in corruption control.
However, the major contribution of our research lies in the attempt to understand the phenomenon of corruption in
ight of the concept of ‘public accountability’. By understanding this concept in terms of Rousseau’s theory of the social
ontract, we have highlighted the intertwined relationship between the virtue of autonomy (to be accountable) and the
ntersubjective and political meaning of democracy (to be held accountable) at the centre of what we  have deﬁned as ‘new
ublic corruption’. As a result, some ‘old’ questions have proven to be useful for understanding the contemporary face of
orruption and the validity of modern managerial practices.
Due to the complexity of the phenomenon of corruption, the primary limitation of this study is that it focuses exclusively
n state intervention in consumption and does not provide an analysis of other domains, such as the direct production of
oods and services (see Fig. 3).
Certainly, a valuable contribution to the comprehension of the phenomenon may, for example, derive from the analysis
f corruption as it occurs within the context of private-public partnership and state-owned enterprises. However, this
imitation points beyond the scope of the present paper to directions for future research on the role of corruption in public
anagement.Please cite this article in press as: Grossi, G., & Pianezzi, D. The new public corruption: Old questions for new challenges.
Accounting Forum (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor.2016.05.002
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